


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PSB 2-6

20 December 1951

ITEM 2

Program for Soviet Orbit Escapees



Summary: This staff study is the product of PSB action of 25 October 1951, which directed the formation of a panel to consider this problem. This study represents the first of two papers to be prepared on this subject and recommends the assignment of responsibility for assuring proper care and disposal of escapees from the Soviet Orbit who cannot be utilized in existing U. S. programs. This is urgent since IRO ceases existence at the end of February, 1952. After thorough consideration of all potential Governmental and private organizations or agencies to administer and coordinate this activity, the study recommends that the State Department be charged with the over-all administering and coordinating responsibility, with certain supporting responsibilities incumbent upon CIA, Department of Defense, and the MSA.

Paragraph 20, page 8, of the main report sets forth five possible sources of financial support for this activity. At the PSB Alternates Meeting on Monday, 17 December, the Department of State indicated it would prefer assurance of its operating funds from one source and felt that the MSA should provide the full 8 million dollars, instead of the present 2½ million dollars tentatively allocated against the Kirsten Amendment. The Department of State feels further that it should have the freedom of decision with respect to how the administering will be performed, i.e., with augmented personnel or by sub-delegation to an appropriate non-governmental commission or committee. The points raised by the Department of State appear valid and reasonable.

Recommendation: (a) That you note, and approve the recommendations of the report (pages 12 and 13), with particular reference to paragraph e. page 13; (b) That you propose the addition of the following clause in the recommendations pertaining to

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(c) That you concur in the recommendations and support the concepts with respect to administration and financing advanced by the State member.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

SUBJECT: ESCAPEES FROM THE SOVIET ORBIT

Noted by DCI

20 Dec 57 *JS*

For reasons set forth in the attachment, our investigation of the above subject has been divided into two separate studies. The first, having to do with the handling of those escapees who are now crossing into Western Europe, is attached.

This first study has been prepared by the Board's staff with the assistance of departmental and agency representatives. It incorporates most of their suggestions made individually and as members of an inter-departmental panel which was organized pursuant to the Board's direction and which considered an earlier draft of the study.

All who have been concerned with the general problem of escapees agree that it is of great and immediate importance to improve the manner of their treatment. Failure to take adequate care of them jeopardizes a critical segment of our psychological efforts against the satellites and the Soviet Union. Conversely, adequate handling will directly strengthen these present efforts and will make possible the launching of new programs for the greater exploitation of escapees and of disaffected persons who remain behind the Iron Curtain.

For these reasons this first study has been developed rapidly. Because of this and the complexity of the problem it may be that some of its parts have not been given as extensive interdepartmental examination as would have been possible in a more deliberate study. The staff is aware of this but feels nevertheless that in general the best available solutions are proposed to the many difficult problems which were encountered. We, therefore, hope that in recognizing the importance of immediate attention to the escapee problem the Board will overlook any imperfections in polish and in refinement.

It is recommended that at its next meeting the Board consider the attached study and adopt its recommendation.

Attachment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

PSB—D-18

*John Sherman*  
John Sherman  
Assistant Director  
Office of Coordination

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*20 Dec 57 - PSB approved and amended and D-18 as a basis for further action*

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December 15, 1951

PROGRAM FOR SOVIET ORBIT ESCAPEESI. Statement of the Problem

1. To determine the best means under existing policy to employ, resettle, and care for current escapees from the Soviet orbit or its control. ✓

II. Purpose of the Study

2. At its fourth meeting the Psychological Strategy Board took the action set forth in Annex 1.
3. Pursuant to the Board's direction, a Panel was established on November 2, consisting of representatives of Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the NATO Standing Group, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, CIA, the Mutual Security Agency, and the Bureau of the Budget. The Assistant Director of PSB's Office of Coordination acted as steering member.
4. In the light of the initial Panel discussion, the PSB staff determined that the total problem, which the Board had considered, must be separated into two parts, each of which required separate study. ✓  
Those separate studies are:

✓ For the purpose of this paper, escapees are those persons from the territory or control of the USSR, the Baltic States, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania, who escape into Western Europe, ranging from Turkey to Sweden. East Germans, Chinese, and other expellees, such as Turks and Greeks, are not included.

✓ This separation in the problem was made for two reasons. In the first place, before the West can expect success from existing programs, let alone new and expanded programs, designed to defeat or to enlist the support of persons in Iron Curtain countries, it must be able to demonstrate on the basis of present practice that the West is, after all, a desirable place to which to flee, or with which to cooperate. Thus, it is clear that the adequate handling of all bonafide escapees bears directly upon the flow and cooperation of such individuals who are qualified as sources of intelligence, intelligence agents, recruits for psychological and paramilitary programs, as these have been developed pursuant to NSC-10/2, 10/5, 96/1 and 10-13.

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- c. Lodge Bill: The Lodge Bill passed in 1950 and amended in 1951 authorizes the enlistment in the United States Army of 12,500 unmarried aliens. During 1951, no escapees were enlisted. During 1951, 113 had been enlisted, 97 of whom are presently training in the United States. Four thousand escapees have applied for enlistment and of these 1500 are in the process of security screening. Under the program as it is now being administered by the Army, it is unlikely that a significant number of the 18,000 escapees will be enlisted in the United States Army during 1952.

13. Other Capabilities of the U. S. Government.

Under the Mutual Security Act in the Kirsten Amendment, Congress authorized ~~\$100,000~~ <sup>\$100,000,000</sup> which can be drawn upon for utilization in the problem of escapees. Congress apparently intended that these funds should be used primarily for training and equipping escapee forces to be added to NATO, rather than for the care of escapees. However, the authorization is sufficiently broad to permit the utilization of a portion of these funds for the latter purpose in the implementation of the program contemplated in this study. MSA and the Department of Defense may feel that this authorization is in fact a requirement for the use of some of these funds for the first purpose and it will be recommended that programs of this character be considered in the second PSB study.

IV. Discussion and Conclusions

14. It is estimated that some 13-15,000 escapees can be resettled through the Migrant Committee aggressively encouraged by the U.S. and with maximum support of voluntary agencies. Some 2,000-2,500 can be absorbed into the indigenous facilities of Europe; the Lodge Bill, while it will, under present programs, absorb less than 300 has a considerably larger authorization.

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While it is recognized that these programs can only satisfy these requirements if they are fully coordinated, adequately financed, and aggressively administered, it is apparent that the programs are capable of absorbing the expected flow of escapees.

15. While it is possible that the psychological effect of adequate handling of these escapees will increase the flow, it is equally likely that the Communists will increase the severity of repressive measures and that this will reduce the rate of escape. However,

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of the private U. S. refugee organizations now carried on by the State Department. Since the State Department is currently planning and programming for the Migrant Committee operation and for the coordination of voluntary agencies, this transfer of responsibility would appear to be undesirable.

- c. A Single Private Refugee Organization: At the present time, no single private organization has adequate funds to handle the job and no one private organization is responsible for assisting Soviet orbit escapees. The International Rescue Committee, whose Board is chaired by General Spang, hopes to receive \$2 million for the purpose of assisting escapees. The IRC has been the organization most active in this field and last year spent more than 1/3 of the money provided by private organizations for the assistance of escapees. The present Executive Director of IRC has not been reliable in dealing with the U. S. government and is not fully supported by the State Department.
- d. National Committee for Free Europe: Although NCFE is not now concerned with escapee programs it might be possible to establish a new office in the National Committee to handle the escapee problem. An organization under NCFE would have the advantage of being able to get into action rapidly since a staff and space already exist both here and abroad. It is known that the International Rescue Committee would be willing to work closely with NCFE. ~~Such an organization might be established as a subsidiary of the NCFE. The main disadvantage of such an organization are that it does not presently have a staff skilled in refugee matters and it is not likely that some of the private refugee organizations, particularly the religious ones, would be willing to tie their programs in with a recognized cold war organization such as NCFE. For the same reason, it is unlikely that the Ford Foundation would commit substantial funds to NCFE since it is known that members of the Board of the Foundation are opposed to the support of aggressive cold war operations. Furthermore, it is known that NCFE is already heavily loaded down with its present functions and it might not be desirable to add to these.~~
- e. A New Private Organization: In order to utilize the existing funds and personnel of present private organizations in this field, it might be desirable to create an organization along the lines of the Community Chest, with an Executive Director and a Board of Directors representing all of the private U. S. organizations concerned with escapees from the Soviet orbit. In order to create such an organization it would be necessary to have a strong Executive Director supported by the U. S. government, as well as by private organizations, and it would be necessary to raise a substantial sum of money to serve as a catalyst to

persuade and organizations to participate and cooperate. The Ford Foundation has indicated that it is interested in exploring the possibility of the creation of such a new organization and might be willing to give its sponsorship. In addition, according to preliminary estimates, the Foundation may be willing to place up to \$1 million at the disposal of such an organization. A major disadvantage would be the time required to set up such an organization and the resistance of many private organizations ~~to~~ being associated with an organization apparently engaged in cold war operations. Another disadvantage of creating such an organization would be the difficulty of insuring a coordinated operation in the field, particularly since some of the private organizations have very specialized activities. For example, the American Fund for Czech Refugees concerns itself only with Czech escapees.

It is absolutely indispensable that any private organization established for the handling of this program cooperate with the U.S. Government, particularly in the reception centers and also in the disposal of escapees who can not be absorbed on a full-time basis by the U.S. Government operations.

After considering the advantages and disadvantages of each of these alternatives, it is concluded that the most feasible alternative is that under which the State Department would assume the over-all administrative and coordinating responsibilities.

#### V. Recommendations

23. It is recommended that the PSB:

a. Request the State Department

- (1) to accept the responsibility of administering the escapee program outlined in this study,
- (2) to develop and put into effect as a matter of urgency an operational plan under which the functions set forth in paragraph 18 will be carried out. Among other actions this plan should provide for:
  - (a) The necessary administrative action, both in Washington and in the field.
  - (b) ~~Coordination~~ <sup>Cooperation</sup> with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to insure that adequate facilities are provided for the screening of all escapees for employment in the several U.S. psychological, operational, or intelligence programs.
  - (c) Periodic reports to the PSB on the implementation of this program.

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b.



c. Request the Department of Defense:

- (1) To request the Department of the Army to liberalize the conditions under which escapees may be recruited under the authorization of the Lodge Bill and to take all feasible steps to expand such recruiting.

d. Request the <sup>DIRECTOR</sup>Mutual Security <sup>AGENCY</sup>Administration:

- (1) To cooperate with the Department of State in planning and programming for the necessary use of an estimated \$2 million dollars of counterpart and Carioa funds.
- (2) To provide an estimated \$2,500,000 of the funds authorized by the Kirsten Amendment for utilization in effecting the implementation of the escapee program.

e. Request the Director of the PSB:

- (1) To insure that arrangements be made under which the necessary interdepartmental coordination of this program will be effected.
- (2) To undertake the continuing evaluation of the effectiveness of this program as a matter of National psychological interest.
- (3) To continue with the immediate preparation of the additional studies and recommendations authorized in the 4th meeting of the PSB.

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Action of PSB on October 25, 1957. Regarding  
Defectors, Refugees and Potential Guerrillas  
From and in the Soviet Orbit

At its fourth meeting, PSB took the following action:

"Action: In view of the importance to psychological strategic and operational planning, and to obtaining intelligence necessary thereto, of arranging for the care of escapees from the Iron Curtain countries and of developing a program or programs therefor, and methods of financing the same, with minimum confusion and waste-time, the Board approved the following actions, proposed by

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"(1) That the Psychological Strategy Board call a joint meeting of all agencies concerned with the problem of defectors, refugees, and potential guerrillas now resident in the Iron Curtain countries for the purpose of considering what, if any, concrete projects and programs might be undertaken by the United States Government with respect to such defectors, refugees and potential guerrillas if funds therefor were available.

"(2) That the Psychological Strategy Board provide a steering member to a panel which is directed (a) to consider what, if any projects and programs of the foregoing character might further national strategic objectives; (b) to monitor the development of specific projects and programs that meet this requirement; (c) to coordinate any such project or program with national strategic objectives; and (d) to consider all possible sources for the financing thereof.

"(3) In the event that the studies contemplated under (2) above should indicate that certain specific programs and projects having merit cannot be financed without recourse to section 101(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, that the Psychological Strategy Board or such of its constituent agencies as may be primarily involved submit such projects and programs for the consideration of the Director of Mutual Security".

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## ATTACHMENT "A"

FACTORS INFLUENCING FLOW  
OF IRON CURTAIN ESCAPEESI. General Factors

1. The demonstration of satisfactory reception, care, and positive use or resettlement may encourage a sizable number of potential escapees to take action. Soviet counter measures may be expected to minimize this additional flow.
2. The probable flow of escapees will vary in proportion to any decline in the Soviet power status vis-a-vis Western dominance in international affairs, particularly in the peripheral areas such as Germany. Conversely, lacking a significant power shift, a progressively numerical decline over a two-year period cannot be ruled out should Soviet counter measures prove increasingly effective in combatting defection.

II. Action by other Non-Communist Governments

3. Inducement operations by other nations of the West are mostly restricted

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
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III. U. S. Intelligence and Psychological Programs

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7. Mass defection is a phenomenon receiving attention but there is no suitable precedent for assessing prospects for it under a cold war situation. The cited large scale desertions of Russians to the Nazis during World War II were primarily induced by the nearness of an army able to do combat with regime forces. NSC-36/1 directs acceptance of the risk of mass defection in programs aimed at USSR nationals but indicates little hope of such a result.

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ATTACHMENT "B"

ABSORPTION OF ESCAPEES THROUGH UTILIZATION  
IN INTELLIGENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS

I. NSC-86/1

1. The United States policy concerning Soviet and Satellite defectors is enunciated by NSC-86/1, approved by the President on 19 April 1951. The interest of this Government in such persons is stated to include: (a) benefits to intelligence and related activities; (b) propaganda use and value; (c) denial of valuable personnel; (d) increasing disaffection and confusion within the communist regimes; (e) obtaining persons important to the national interest because of background and knowledge. All Soviet and Satellite nationals who escape from control of the USSR or countries in the Soviet orbit are viewed as defectors for purposes of NSC-86/1 objectives; and it is specifically stated that the proper reception and handling of all such persons must be a matter of concern to the U.S. if NSC-86/1 objectives are not to be jeopardized. However, the NSC-86/1 policy underlines that encouragement and inducement of defections among Satellite nationals should be restricted to key personnel.

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Responsibility for assuring proper handling and care of defectors

has not been assigned to any United States agency except as the Department of State is directed in NSC-86/1 to encourage granting of asylum and proper treatment for escapees by countries bordering the Soviet bloc. The public statement concerning asylum issued by IICOG on 29 April 1951 and representations by the Department of State to the Government of Yugoslavia regarding handling of escapees are noted in this regard.

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IV. Additional Programs

8. The buildup of emigre groups, through absorption of present escapees and selective inducement of defection on a large scale, has been proposed to achieve such objectives as the formulation of military units to be incorporated into national forces or into an European Army and the development of political organizations for a variety of purposes. As indicated by the Kirsten amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Congress now favors action along one or more of these lines. However, as indicated in the main paper, the objectives of cold war strategy involved in such action are not yet fully formulated and the strategy, itself, is therefore in embryo form. Therefore, the question of the purposes for which emigre groups should be developed and the character and scale of such build-up must be reserved for later study.

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